Politics Without Romance: Democracy, Constitutionalism, and Public Choice
Over the last three decades, public choice theory has emerged as a prominent research agenda in economics and political science that addresses central themes of constitutionally constrained government with the tools of economic analysis. This conference addressed the impact of the public choice school with a particular focus on “classic” texts in that tradition.
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Buchanan, James M. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1999.
Buchanan, James M. The Collected Works of J. M. Buchanan, Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000.
Buchanan, James M. and Roger D. Congleton. Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Olson, Mancur. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 567-576.
Sen, Amartya. “Rationality and Social Choice.” American Economic Review 85 (1995): 1-24.
Tullock, Gordon. The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Volume 1: Virginia Political Economy. Edited by Charles K. Rowley. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2004.
Vanberg, Viktor J. The Constitution of Markets: Essays in Political Economy. London: Routledge, 2001.
Weingast, Barry. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 245-263.