Liberty, Responsibility, and Community in the Work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom
ABSTRACT
The Bloomington School has enormous relevance for our understanding of economic and policy analysis in Latin America, in particular in the areas of resource governance (common-pool resources), polycentricity, the need to adopt a new and multidisciplinary approach, and the elaboration of a new method for the analysis of institutional change that is cognizant of and consistent with the principles of a free society, self-regulation and collective action, the role of social capital and incentives, and the importance of well-defined property rights.
READING LIST
Conference Readings
Andersson, Krister P. and Elinor Ostrom. “Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective.” Policy Sciences 41, no. 1 (March 2008): 71-93.
Boettke, Peter J. “Is the Only Form of ’Reasonable Regulation’ Self Regulation?: Lessons from Lin Ostrom on Regulating the Commons and Cultivating Citizens.” Public Choice 143 (January 2010): 283-291.
Dietz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern. “The Struggle to Govern the Commons.” Science 302, no. 5652 (December 2003): 1907-1912.
Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162, no. 3859 (December 1968): 1243-1248.
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Ostrom, Elinor. “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (2000): 137-158.
Ostrom, Elinor, “El Gobierno de los Bienes Comunes Desde el Punto de Vista de la Ciudadanía” In Genes, Bytes y Emisiones: Bienes Comunes y Ciudadanía, compiled by Silke Helfrich. Mexico City: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2008. 268-278.
Ostrom, Elinor, “Developing a Method for Analyzing Institutional Change” In Alternative Institutional Structures: Evolution and Impact, edited by Sandra Batie and Nicholas Mercuro, 48-76. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008.
Ostrom, Elinor. “Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis.” Journal of Institutional Economics 3, no. 3 (2007): 239-264.
Ostrom, Elinor. “How do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?.” Annual Neale Wheeler Watson Lecture, Nobel Museum, Stockholm, Sweden, April 12, 2008.
Ostrom, Elinor. “Design Principles of Robust Property-Right Institutions: What Have We Learned?.” Land Policies and Property Rights, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 2–3, 2008.
Ostrom, Elinor and Gordon P. Whitaker, “Community Control and Governmental Responsiveness: The Case of Police in Black Neighborhoods” In Improving the Quality of Urban Management, edited by Willis Hawley and David Rogers, 303-334. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974.
Ostrom, Elinor and Xavier Basurto. “Crafting tools for the study of intuitional change.” Journal of Institutional Economics (2011): 317-343.
Ostrom, Elinor, Marco A. Janssen, and John M. Anderies. “Going beyond panaceas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104, no. 39 (September 2007): 15176-15178.
Ostrom, Vincent, “Polycentricity” In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies, edited by Michael D. McGinnis, 52-74. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
Ostrom, Vincent, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren. “The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry.” American Political Science Review 55, no. 4 (1961): 831-842.