Liberty, Democracy, and Public Choice
Public choice theory explains how democracy works and how institutions such as constitutions can be constructed to produce better social outcomes. The insights offered by public choice methodology could be especially useful in the context of South Asia.
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Buchanan, James M. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1999.
Buchanan, James M. and Roger D. Congleton. Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Olson, Mancur. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 567-576.
Parikh, Sunita, and Barry R. Weingast. “A comparative theory of federalism: India.” Virginia Law Review 83 (1997): 1593-1615.
Rajagopalan, Shruti. “The Role of Ideology in Constitutional Craftsmanship.” SUNY Purchase Working Paper, Fairfax, Virginia, 2015.
Rajan, Roby. “Entrepreneurship and Rent Seeking in India.” Cato Journal 8, no. 1 (1988): 165-184.
Singh, Jaivir. “Separation of Powers and the Erosion of the ‘Right to Property’ in India.” Constitutional Political Economy 17, no. 4 (2006): 303-324.
Tullock, Gordon. The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Volume 1: Virginia Political Economy. Edited by Charles K. Rowley. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2004.
Tullock, Gordon. The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Volume 5: The Rent-Seeking Society. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2004.
Vanberg, Viktor J. The Constitution of Markets, Essays in Political Economy. London: Routledge, 2001.