Character, Free Will, and Responsibility
This colloquium explored the relations between freedom of the will and responsibility for character as a way of focusing on some crucial issues concerning the nature of moral agency and responsibility. It addressed questions concerning the ways in which people’s characters—their values, dispositions, policies of judgment, and patterns of responses—are voluntary, and some of the main implications for how we understand morality and politics. We considered the extent to which agents are responsible for what they are like as well as for what they do, and the bearing of this matter on our understanding of liberty, what sort of liberty matters most, and the conditions for exercising it.
From Liberty Fund
The Theory of Moral Sentiments
By Adam Smith
Edited by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith’s first and in his own mind most important work, outlines his view of proper conduct and the institutions and sentiments that make men virtuous. Here he develops his doctrine of the impartial spectator, whose hypothetical disinterested judgment we must use to distinguish right from…
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