Books

Author
Title
Categories
Collection
Limits of Liberty The

The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan By James M. Buchanan
Foreword by Hartmut Kliemt

Economics

Published originally in 1975, The Limits of Liberty made James Buchanan’s name more widely known than ever before among political philosophers and theorists and established Buchanan, along with John Rawls and Robert Nozick, as one of the three new contractarians, standing on the shoulders of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant.

Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty The

The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty By James M. Buchanan
Foreword by Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, and Robert D. Tollison

Economics

The thirty-one papers presented in this volume offer scholars and general readers alike a comprehensive introduction to the work of one of the greatest economists of the modern era. Many of Buchanan’s most important essays are gathered in this inaugural volume of the twenty-volume series from Liberty Fund of his Collected Works.

Moral Science and Moral Order

Moral Science and Moral Order By James M. Buchanan
Foreword by Hartmut Kliemt

Economics

This volume presents a representative sampling of James M. Buchanan’s philosophical views as he deals with fundamental problems of moral science and moral order. As one might expect, Buchanan always goes back to fundamental principles first. From there, his observations and conclusions range far and wide from his own discipline.

Politics as Public Choice

Politics as Public Choice By James M. Buchanan
Foreword by Robert D. Tollison

Economics

This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his founding work on public-choice theory.

Politics by Principle Not Interest

Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Toward Nondiscriminatory Democracy By James M. Buchanan and Roger D. Congleton
Foreword by Hartmut Kliemt

Economics

“Politics by principle is that which modern politics is not. What we observe is ‘politics by interest,’ whether in the form of explicitly discriminatory treatment (rewarding or punishing) of particular groupings of citizens or of some elitist-dirigiste classification of citizens into the deserving or non-deserving on the basis of a presumed superior wisdom about what is really ‘good’ for us all. The proper principle for politics is that of generalization of generality.”

Power to Tax The

The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution By Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan
Foreword by Geoffrey Brennan

Economics

Commenting on his collaboration with Geoffrey Brennan on The Power to Tax, James M. Buchanan says that the book is “demonstrable proof of the value of genuine research collaboration across national-cultural boundaries.” Buchanan goes on to say that “The Power to Tax is informed by a single idea—the implications of a revenue-maximizing government.”

Public Finance in Democratic Process

Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice By James M. Buchanan
Foreword by Geoffrey Brennan

Economics

Public Finance in Democratic Process is James M. Buchanan’s monumental work that outlines the dynamics of individual choice as it is displayed in the process of public finance.

Public Principles of Public Debt

Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement By James M. Buchanan
Foreword by Geoffrey Brennan

Economics

Public Principles of Public Debt is one of James M. Buchanan’s most important and influential books. The radical idea he conceived was that our reliance on public debt has amassed a sort of orthodoxy that is commonly—and needlessly—assumed by taxpayers, by politicians, and by economists themselves.

Reason of Rules The

The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy By Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan
Foreword by Robert D. Tollison

Economics

In his foreword, Robert D. Tollison identifies the main objective of Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan’s The Reason of Rules: “. . . a book-length attempt to focus the energies of economists and other social analysts on the nature and function of the rules under which ordinary political life and market life function.”